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Abstract
Using European data, this paper ﬁnds that (1) industry entry and exit rates
are positively related to industry rates of investment-speciﬁc technical change
(ISTC); (2) the sensitivity of industry entry and exit rates to cross-country
diﬀerences in entry costs depends on industry rates of ISTC.
The paper constructs a general equilibrium model in which the rate of
ISTC varies across industries and new investment-speciﬁc technologies can be
introduced by entrants or by incumbents. In the calibrated model, equilibrium
behavior is consistent with stylized facts (1) and (2), provided the cost of
technology adoption is increasing in the rate of ISTC.
JEL Codes: D92, L26, O33, O41.
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11 Introduction
Entry and exit rates diﬀer signiﬁcantly across industries. Over the period 1963-
1982, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) ﬁnd that ﬁve-year entry rates in US
manufacturing data range from 21 percent in Tobacco to 60 percent in Scientiﬁc
Instruments. High-entry industries are high-exit industries, suggesting that entry
and exit are largely due to the same industry-speciﬁcf a c t o r s . A tt h es a m et i m e ,
little is known about what these factors might be.
This paper ﬁnds a strong, positive link between industry entry and exit rates and
t h ep a c eo ft e c h n i c a lp r o g r e s si nt h ec a p i t a lg o o d st h a tt h ei n d u s t r yu s e s—t h er a t eo f
investment-speciﬁc technical change (ISTC). A signiﬁcant fraction of entry and exit
thus represents the introduction and replacement of capital-embodied technologies.
ISTC is also positively related to the proportion of enterprises in each industry
that displays large investment outlays in a given year. That investment often occurs
in "spikes" has been known since at least Doms and Dunne (1998), and the results
link this pattern to the replacement of new capital-embodied technologies by incum-
bents. Furthermore, the decision of whether (or when) to exit appears sensitive to
policy: in countries in which the cost of entry is high, rates of entry and exit are
disproportionately suppressed in industries with high rates of ISTC.
To analyze these ﬁndings, the paper develops a general equilibrium model in
which changing the vintage of capital used by a particular enterprise is costly. In
the model, this vintage is termed a "technology", and an enterprise is a technology-
manager pair. The manager accumulates expertise with a given technology over
time, and at any date may choose to upgrade to a newer technology — at the expense
of accumulated expertise, as in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996). The manager may also
choose to close the enterprise at any date — opting instead to open a new enterprise,
or to work.
The model generates endogenous entry, exit, and investment spikes. Since ad-
justing the vintage of the capital at a given establishment is costly, technological
improvements in the production of capital goods erode the proﬁtability of incum-
bents, so that eventually they either close or invest in updated capital. Investment
spikes are typically modelled using non-convex capital adjustment costs, as in Khan
and Thomas (2008). In the current model, adjusting the quantity of capital is cost-
less: instead, the process of technology adoption itself generates lumpy investment,
as in Klenow (1998).
Equilibrium behavior along the balanced growth path of the model economy is
consistent with the stylized facts relating turnover to ISTC. The decline in equilib-
rium proﬁts as an enterprise falls behind the industry frontier is more rapid if the rate
2of ISTC is high so that, when only new enterprises may implement new technologies,
equilibrium rates of entry and exit are positively related to the industry rate of ISTC.
In a calibration of the model in which incumbents too may adopt new technologies,
ISTC accounts for a signiﬁcant proportion of the observed cross-industry variation
in entry and exit rates. Rates of ISTC are positively linked to the prevalence of
investment spikes, as updating occurs sooner when the rate of ISTC is high. Entry
costs in the model also suppress turnover in high-ISTC industries, as in the data.
Notably, the ability of the model economy to match the empirical magnitude of these
relationships depends on a positive link between technological adoption costs and the
rate of ISTC — as in, for example, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997).
A theoretical link between turnover and technical change dates back at least to
Schumpeter (1934), and an empirical link is studied in Mueller and Tilton (1969),
Geroski (1989) and Audretsch (1991). However, these authors do not consider the
rate of technical change as a determinant of long term industry diﬀerences in turnover
and, in particular, none of them raises ISTC as an inﬂuence on lifecycle dynamics.
This paper uses entry and exit data from 18 European countries: most studies of
entry and exit are limited to manufacturing data, and an additional contribution of
the paper is that service and other industries are covered also.
The model extends the framework of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) to allow
for multiple industries and for technical progress. In a survey of entry and exit,
Geroski (1995) reports little success in relating diﬀerences in turnover rates to indus-
try characteristics, mostly measures of proﬁtability or entry barriers. In a general
equilibrium context, even when there are no industry diﬀerences in proﬁtability nor
entry barriers, the model shows that there can be signiﬁcant diﬀerences in equilib-
rium turnover rates due to diﬀerences in lifecycle dynamics. Following Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002), ISTC is measured
using the quality-adjusted relative price of capital used in each industry: however,
these papers do not link ISTC to lifecycle dynamics.
Campbell (1998) argues that ISTC may aﬀect the cyclical behavior of aggregate
entry and exit, and Klenow (1998) studies the cyclicality of investment in a related
model. Samaniego (2008) ﬁnds that turnover and ISTC are positively related in
a calibrated one-sector general equilibrium model. However, none of these papers
attempts to account for long term cross-industry diﬀerences in turnover — although
Jovanovic and Tse (2006) develop a related model in which new industries with a
high rate of ISTC experience an earlier wave of capital replacement.
Section 2 surveys the empirical relationship between entry, exit, and the rate of
ISTC. Section 3 introduces the model, while Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium
and Section 5 studies the relationship between ISTC and turnover in the model.
3Section 6 concludes with suggestions for future work. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2E v i d e n c e
We examine the empirical relationship between industry rates of enterprise turnover
and industry rates of ISTC. We also relate the prevalence of establishment-level
investment "spikes" to ISTC. Finally, we use cross-country data to examine whether
the partial correlation between ISTC and turnover is sensitive to policies that make
entry costly.
2.1 Data
We measure industry entry and exit rates using the Eurostat database. Eurostat data
cover the universe of "enterprises" in the business registers of the member countries
of the European Union, and are gathered by their national statistical agencies using
a uniform methodology.1 Previous research on entry and exit mostly focuses on man-
ufacturing data, which produces less than half of GDP in industrialized economies.
The Eurostat data provide a more complete view of entry and exit, covering all
formal economic activity in the non-public, non-farm sector.
Annual rates of entry, exit and turnover are available for 18 countries over the
period 1997 − 2004.T h ev a r i a b l eEntry is the proportion of enterprises active in a
given year t that entered since year t − 1, and the variable Exit is the number of
enterprises that closed between t − 1 and t, divided by the number of enterprises
active in year t.T h e v a r i a b l e Turnover is the sum of these two variables. For
most of the paper, entry exit and turnover are average annual rates over the sample
period for each country-industry pair, to abstract from short term conditions and
from possible delays in the reporting of entry and exit.2
The measure of ISTC is the annual rate of decline in the quality-adjusted price of
capital goods used by each industry, as measured in the United States. Greenwood et
al (1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002) show that, in a competitive environment
with similar Cobb Douglas production functions for diﬀerent goods, a decline in the
price of one good compared to another reﬂects an improvement in the productivity
with which the ﬁrst good is produced relative to the second.
1The enterprise is equivalent to the concept of the "ﬁrm" used by the US Census Bureau.
However, in Eurostat mergers and changes of legal form are not counted as entry, nor are temporary
shut-downs counted as exit. See the Appendix for further details regarding measurement.
2Any delays are likely to be short: for example, in the UK enterprises are removed from the
business register three months after the register is notiﬁed of their closure.
4Cummins and Violante (2002) provide annual quality-adjusted price series for 26
types of equipment. These prices are divided by the oﬃcial consumption and services
deﬂator for each year, so that all capital goods prices are expressed relative to the
price of non-durables. The industry rate of ISTC is the annual rate of decline in the
relative price of capital goods used by that industry. This is computed by weighting
the declines in the individual good prices using annual capital expenditure shares for
each industry, as reported in the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) industry-level
capital ﬂow tables.
Country Turnover Entry Exit
Belgium 14.2 7.2 7.0
Czech Republic 18.5 9.8 8.7
Denmark 17.4 9.4 8.0
Spain 15.1 8.9 6.2
Italy 15.1 7.9 7.2
Latvia 25.4 15.0 10.4
Lithuania 20.7 12.1 8.6
Hungary 21.1 11.6 9.5
Netherlands 17.1 8.9 8.2
Portugal 13.4 7.6 5.8
Slovenia 13.6 7.5 6.1
Slovakia 22.8 10.7 12.1
Finland 14.1 7.5 6.6
Sweden 11.1 5.9 5.1
United Kingdom 21.6 11.1 10.5
Romania 25.6 16.8 8.8
Norway 19.4 10.6 8.8
Switzerland 8.0 3.5 4.5
Europe 17.3 9.5 7.8
Table 1 — Summary statistics: Average annual rates of turnover across countries
1997-2004. The value for Europe is the average across countries, weighted by the
number of enterprises in each. Source — Eurostat.
The ISTC measure can be constructed with or without structures as an addi-
tional capital type. The benchmark results include structures, and results using only
equipment goods are reported for robustness. We use the oﬃcial price series for
structures when we include them, following Cummins and Violante (2002).
5To control for potential simultaneity or lags in the ISTC-turnover link, the in-
d u s t r yI S T Cr a t ei st h ea v e r a g eo v e rt h ep e r i o d1987−1997, the decade prior to the
measurement of entry and exit rates. For robustness, we also consider average ISTC
o v e rt h ee n t i r ep o s t - w a rp e r i o d1947−2000. The correlation between the two series
is 0.91, supporting the interpretation of the rate of ISTC as a long-term industry
characteristic.
The BEA capital ﬂow tables use the NAICS industry classiﬁcation system, whereas
Eurostat uses the NACE 1.1 system. The paper reports results for 41 industries, rep-
resenting the join of the two systems. Rates of ISTC range from about 1.14 percent
for Oil and Gas extraction to 8.33 percent for Air Transport. The median industry
rate is 4.02 percent.
"Investment lumpiness" is measured using US data from Compustat. Over the
period 1997-2004, I identify whether each ﬁrm in the database experiences an invest-
ment "spike." Doms and Dunne (1998) deﬁne a spike as an increase in the capital
stock of 30 p e r c e n to rm o r ew i t h i nay e a r . T h ei n d e xLumpy for industry j is the
proportion of ﬁrms in j that experienced any "spikes" over the period.3 Compustat
covers all publicly traded ﬁrms in the US so that, while not being a representative
sample of US ﬁrms, ﬁrms in Compustat are likely to be ﬁnancially unconstrained, so
that their behavior reﬂects fundamentally technological factors. Values range from
about 0.05 in Utilities to 0.95 in Systems Design.
The unit of observation in Compustat is the ﬁrm, so that updating at multi-plant
ﬁrms may not be detected if the updating is not synchronized. Hence, lumpiness is
also computed for smaller ﬁr m so n l y .T h ed i s a d v a n t a g eo ft h es i z e - b a s e dm e a s u r e s
is that there are very few ﬁrms in Compustat in some industries below certain size
thresholds, so these measures are likely to be noisy.
Some of the regressions require country-level measures of entry costs. I use the
cost of starting a business as a proportion of GDP per capita, as reported in Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), denoted EC. Entry costs are deter-
mined by studying the laws and regulations of entry in each country, identifying re-
quired procedures and computing the cost of complying with each. For international
comparability, and to focus on the costs of entry per se, the procedures considered
are those that apply to a "standardized entrant", deﬁned as one that is not subject
to any special exemptions, is not in a highly regulated industry (such as tobacco or
ﬁnance), does not trade internationally, is domestically owned, operates in the most
3"Investment" is DATA128 (capital expenditures) and "capital stock" is DATA8 (net property,
plant and equipment). The median annual industry value of this variable across manufacturing
industries is 6 percent, strikingly similar to the value reported by Doms and Dunne (1998). Data
were not available for Educational Services nor for Other Services.






















Figure 1: Variation over time in average entry and exit rates in Europe, 1997-2004,
based on Eurostat. Countries are weighted by the number of enterprises in each.
Eurostat does not report entry rates for 1997. Time variation is small relative to
variation across countries and industries, as seen in Table 2.
populous city, does not own real estate and is of medium size. For further details see
Djankov et al (2002) and World Bank (2006).
T h em a i n t a i n e da s s u m p t i o ni st h a tt h er a t eo fI S T C( o rt h er a n k i n g )i sa ni n d u s -
try characteristic that persists across countries. This amounts to assuming similar
input-output tables and similar rates of technical progress in any given type of cap-
ital good across countries. Since the median rate of ISTC is about 4 percent per
year, it is unlikely that signiﬁcant diﬀerences in ISTC for the same industry across
countries could be sustained for long in the absence of draconian import restrictions.
2.2 Turnover and ISTC in cross-section
Table 1 reports average entry and exit rates across Europe, and Figure 1 plots their
behavior over time. Time does not appear to be an important source of variation
in the data. Indeed, analysis of variance indicates that about half of turnover and
entry, and about 40 percent of exit, are attributable to variation across industries
and countries only — see Table 2.
7Variable Industry Country Time Residual Obs
Turnover 0.221 0.274 0.011 0.494 2661
Entry 0.249 0.206 0.013 0.531 3197
Exit 0.118 0.204 0.018 0.660 3027
T a b l e2—A n a l y s i so fv a r i a n c e( A N O V A )f o rt u r n o v e r ,e n t r ya n de x i tr a t e s .
Roughly a quarter of turnover can be attributed to variation across industries,
and another quarter to variation across countries.
Deﬁne industry rates of turnover, entry and exit as the industry ﬁxed eﬀect in a
regression of turnover on industry and country dummies.4 The correlation between
entry and exit rates is 0.67, whereas between turnover and entry it is 0.96,a n d
between turnover and exit it is 0.85.5 Of the 153 possible country pairs in the data-
base, 76 percent of the cross-country correlations in rates of turnover are signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level. This indicates that entry and exit rates in a given industry in
diﬀerent countries may have common, possibly technological, determinants.
ISTC coeﬃcient







Table 3 — Coeﬃcients of a regression of turnover on ISTC. Standard errors are
in brackets. The link between ISTC and turnover is positive and signiﬁcant. In
all tables, one, two and three asterisks represent signiﬁcance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent levels respectively.
The data suggest that ISTC may be one of these determinants. Table 3 reports
coeﬃcients for bivariate regressions of industry rates of industry rates of entry and
4We report this rather than cross-country averages because of a small number of missing obser-
vations (for example, 14 out of 738 observations are missing for entry).
5The correlation between entry and exit rates reported in Dunne et al (1988) for US manufac-
turing industries is 0.74. Brandt (2004) ﬁnds a similar relationship in OECD data and in an earlier
edition of Eurostat which, as here, includes services.

























Figure 2: Cross industry comparison of turnover and ISTC. The dotted line repre-
sents ﬁtted values using the turnover coeﬃcient in the ﬁrst column of Table 3.
exit on ISTC. Strikingly, Table 3 and Figure 2 report that these rates are very highly
correlated. This is true of manufacturing industries and also of non-manufacturing
industries, which report correlations with turnover of 0.45 and 0.56 respectively.
Correlations are even stronger for the ISTC measure that excludes structures. The
eﬀects are large: a 1 percent increase in ISTC is associated with a 1.24 percent
increase in the annual rate of turnover. It is worth noting that, using industry
turnover rates at the level of individual countries instead of industry ﬁxed eﬀects,
the coeﬃcient on ISTC is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in 14 of 18 cases.
These ﬁndings suggest that entry and exit represent, at least in part, the intro-
duction and abandonment of capital-embodied technologies. However, capital may
be introduced at continuing enterprises as well as new ones. The replacement of a
large proportion of the capital stock at a given enterprise is likely to coincide with
an investment spike, and we might expect as a result that industries with higher
rates of ISTC might display more investment spikes. Indeed, Table 4 s h o w st h a tt h e
index Lumpy is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with entry, exit and ISTC.
This is regardless of whether Lumpy is computed using all ﬁrms in Compustat, or
only those below a certain size thresholds. A 1 percent increase in the rate of ISTC
leads to a 3.8-5.3 percent increase in the prevalence of investment spikes.
92.3 Interacting ISTC with entry costs
The costs imposed by the regulation of entry are known to vary signiﬁcantly across
countries. Cross-country diﬀerences in industry behavior and the regulation of entry
may provide further insight into the determinants of turnover — and, in particular,
into whether technological diﬀusion through turnover is sensitive to policy.
For entrepreneurs, the opportunity cost of operating an enterprise includes the
value of closing the enterprise and opening a new one. If the institutionally imposed
cost of entry is high, the value of incumbency increases relative to the value of new
entry. If entry and exit reﬂect the introduction and replacement of technologies,
entrepreneurs may avoid a high entry cost entirely by adopting new technologies at
existing enterprises instead of exiting. Hence, we might expect entry costs to reduce
rates of exit disproportionately in indust r i e si nw h i c ht h er a t eo fI S T Ci sh i g h .T o
the extent that turnover is a long-run phenomenon, rates of entry, and of overall
turnover, should also be especially sensitive to entry costs in high-ISTC industries.
Size Turnover Entry Exit ISTC
All ﬁrms 2.41*** 3.11*** 6.04*** 5.32***
(0.748) (1.072) (2.056) (1.851)
Under 500 1.98** 2.69** 4.73** 5.09***
(0.765) (1.089) (2.135) (1.847)
Under 250 1.57** 2.40** 2.88 3.84**
(0.774) (1.086) (2.202) (1.874)
Table 4 — Bivariate regressions of lumpiness on turnover and ISTC.
"Lumpiness" is the share of ﬁrms in Compustat experiencing an
investment spike during the period 1987-1997. The column "Size"
indicates whether a threshold was imposed on the number of employees
at the ﬁrms used to compute the lumpiness index. The link between
lumpiness and ISTC (as well as turnover) is positive and signiﬁcant.
To test for these patterns, I adopt the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach pio-
neered by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Let yj,c be entry, exit or turnover for industry
j in country c.V a r i a b l eISTCj measures the rate of ISTC in industry j,a n dECc
measures entry costs in country c. Then, estimate the equation:
yj,c = δj + αc + β.ISTCj × ECc + νj,c (1)
In equation (1), αc and δj capture all country- and industry-speciﬁcf a c t o r sa ﬀecting
entry and exit rates . If entry costs reduce enterprise turnover disproportionately in
10high- ISTC industries, the coeﬃcient β on the interaction term ISTCj ×ECc should
be negative.
Industries Turnover Interaction Obs R2
included measure coeﬃcient β
All industries Turnover -0.68*** 719 0.34
(0.254)
Entry -0.31** 724 0.31
(0.140)
Exit -0.37** 721 0.30
(0.150)
Manuf. only Turnover -1.31*** 283 0.52
(0.439)
Entry -1.00** 284 0.42
(0.418)
Exit -0.39** 284 0.46
(0.153)
Non-Manuf. Turnover -0.67** 436 0.34
(0.255)
Entry -0.29* 440 0.32
(0.144)
Exit -0.38** 437 0.28
(0.151)
Table 5 — Eﬀect on turnover of the interaction between ISTC and entry costs.
Country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects (αc,δj) are omitted for brevity. Standard
errors are reported in brackets, and allow for correlated errors across countries
within an industry. Coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant in all cases,
indicating that entry costs disproportionately lower turnover in industries with
high rates of ISTC.
The coeﬃcient on the interaction term between ISTC and entry costs is negative
and signiﬁcant — see Table 5. This is regardless of whether turnover, entry or exit is
the dependent variable in the regression, indicating that policy can delay technological
diﬀusion through turnover.
To get a sense of the magnitude of these coeﬃcients, consider the following. The
country with the lowest entry cost is the UK (5.6 percent of GDP per head), and the
highest is Hungary (81 percent). The coeﬃcients imply that the diﬀerence in entry
11rates between the industries with the highest and lowest rates of ISTC in Hungary
is about 6.6 percent smaller than in the UK. Since industry rates of entry vary from
about 0.09 to about 0.21, this represents a substantial diﬀerence — although not large
enough to overturn the positive relationship between ISTC and turnover.
Speciﬁcation Turnover Interaction R2
measure coeﬃcient β
Baseline spec., Turnover -0.56** 0.34
ISTC measured (0.261)




Baseline spec., Turnover -0.54** 0.34
ISTC measured (0.228)




Baseline spec., Turnover -0.68*** 0.49
industry dummies (0.252)
constrained to be Entry -0.31** 0.45
a linear function (0.140)
of ISTC. Exit -0.37** 0.37
(0.149)
Table 6 — Eﬀect on turnover of the interaction between ISTC and entry costs.
Country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects (αc,δj) are omitted for brevity. Standard
errors are reported in brackets, and allow for correlated errors across countries
within an industry. Coeﬃcients are all negative and mostly signiﬁcant, indicating
the robustness of the results from Table 5 to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and
approaches to measuring ISTC.
It is interesting to check the robustness — or generality — of the results by seeing
whether they hold if manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries are treated
separately. While standard errors are larger, the inference does not change.
Repeating the regressions with ISTC measures from the entire post-war period
yields much the same results, consistent with the hypothesis that ISTC is a long-run
12industry characteristic related to entry and exit rates. See Table 6. Results are
robust to measuring ISTC with and without structures.6 Results are also broadly
similar when the industry dummies are constrained to be a linear function of ISTC
(δj = δ.ISTCj),r e ﬂecting the importance of ISTC for industry indices of turnover.
Finally, replacing the Djankov (2002) measure of entry costs with the World Bank
(2006) update of this measure did not change the results.
3 Economic Environment
This section develops a general equilibrium model with entry and exit, to assess
to what extent a vintage-style framework can account for the above ﬁndings. As
we shall see, the positive link between ISTC and turnover features in a relatively
simple vintage setup. However, reproducing the interaction of ISTC with entry costs
requires a richer model, in which exit is not the only option facing an enterprise with
an obsolete technology.
In the model, a continuum of enterprises of endogenous mass live in continuous
time. An enterprise is a technology, implemented by a manager/entrepreneur with
a degree of success that is stochastic yet persistent. The model thus features het-
erogeneity among enterprises of the same vintage, so that exit is not programmed
simply by the date of birth.
In the model, a technology is a level of investment-speciﬁc technical change. The
capital sector converts the aggregate good into capital goods, and the eﬃciency of
capital production diﬀers by industry and by technology. This allows the relative
price of capital to decline over time at industry-speciﬁc rates that reﬂect the rate
of ISTC, as assumed in Section 2. Entrepreneurs may update the vintage of their
technology: however, updating may decrease their expertise, part of which is vintage-
speciﬁc. Also, at any point, the manager may choose to close the enterprise if the
payoﬀ from her outside option exceeds that of continuation. As a result, entrepre-
neurs may ﬁnd it optimal to be temporarily "locked" into a particular technology,
investing in capital behind the industry frontier until eventually they update or exit.
6Interestingly, results are also similar if ISTCj is replaced with "lumpiness."
133.1 Households and investment











ωj =1 . (2)
It can be used for consumption ct or for investment ij (x,t) in capital goods for any
industry j of type x.I n d e xx is a level of investment speciﬁc technical change. The
stock of each type of capital evolves according to
∂kj (x,t)
∂t
= ij (x,t)x − δkj (x,t) (3)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The index x gives the units of capital
produced from converting one unit of foregone consumption: disinvestment is also
p o s s i b l ea tt h i sr a t e .T h e r ei saf r o n t i e rl e v e lo fx which varies by industry, denoted
¯ xjt. It changes over time at rate gj,s ot h a t¯ xjt =¯ xj0egjt. Parameter gj i st h er a t eo f
investment-speciﬁc technical change experienced by industry j.





Each agent at time t holds kj (x,t) units of capital of type x for industry j.
Each capital type commands a rental rate rj (x,t). Agents are also endowed with
one unit of labor at each date t, which may be used to earn a wage wt or used in
entrepreneurship. An agent raises income by renting capital and labor to enterprises,
and by earning proﬁts πt from enterprises she owns if the agent is an entrepreneur.
She may also receive lump sum transfers λt.
T h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti s
ptct + ptIt ≤ wt + Rt + πt + λt (5)
where It is total investment spending and Rt is total capital income. Agents select
consumption, investment and labor allocations so as to maximize (4), subject to (5).
3.2 Production
Each enterprise is characterized by a technology x, and the manager’s success in
implementing it zt,a sw e l la si t si n d u s t r yj:i t s type is the triple (x,z,j).T h e





t ,α k + αn < 1 (6)
where kt is the quantity of eﬃciency units of capital that it uses, and nt is labor.
Disembodied technology in the model is Ajt = Aj0eκjt.T h u s , gj is the industry
rate of investment-speciﬁc technical change (ISTC), and κj is the industry rate of
disembodied technical change (DTC).7
Technology adoption is costly. At the end of any period, the enterprise may
choose to update its technology x to the frontier, retaining only a proportion ζ<1
of its prior expertise z. Thus, some accumulated knowledge may no longer apply to
the new technology.
Several authors have pointed out that higher rates of ISTC are likely related to
higher adoption costs.8. Hence, let ζ = ζ (gj), ζ
0 (·) ≤ 0.
At Poisson rate η enterprises obtain a new level of productivity z0,d r a w nf r o ma
cumulative distribution f (z0|z) with support z0 ∈ [zl,z h], zl ≥ 0, zh < ∞. Otherwise,
z remains constant (unless x is updated).
3.3 Entry and Exit
Agents in this environment may either work, or create and operate an enterprise.
Creating an enterprise requires a delay of length d before production begins. The
technological cost of entry is ET =1− e−ρd, expressed as a share of expected dis-
counted proﬁts. In addition, startup procedures may impose costs equivalent to a
proportion EC of the expected proﬁts. The proceeds from EC are redistributed as a
lump sum to the households.
Deﬁne E = ET+EC.N o t et h a tE ﬁts the deﬁnition of an entry barrier in McAfee,
Mialon and Williams (2004) of a sunk cost that incumbents avoid but entrants do
not. The formulation of ET as a delay captures the concept of "time to build" in
Kydland and Prescott (1982), while EC reﬂects the ﬁnding of Djankov et al (2002)
that the regulation of entry imposes costs on entrepreneurial activity.
Enterprises start their lives with a value of zt drawn from a distribution ψ,a n d
with the frontier technology. The opportunity cost of entrepreneurial labor is Ut,
7Although x does not enter the production function, it aﬀects proﬁts because it is the rate at
which the economy can produce the capital goods that the enterprise uses, which is reﬂected in the
equilibrium rental rate of capital. In equilibrium, more eﬃcient technologies will be associated with
cheaper capital, providing an incentive to use the frontier technology.
8See Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001) and Bessen (2002).
In a one-sector general equilibrium model, Samaniego (2008) ﬁnds that allowing adoption costs to
respond to the rate of ISTC can be important for its impact on technology adoption decisions.
15to be discussed in more detail below. At any point in time, the entrepreneur may
close the enterprise, also earning a continuation payoﬀ Ut. Once born, enterprises
also close exogenously at Poisson rate χ. Upon exit, entrepreneurs may work in
any industry, or open another enterprise. That entrepreneurs are not tied to any
particular industry and move in and out of the labor market is consistent with the
behavior documented by Lazear (2005).
4 Equilibrium
The competitive price of good j is pjt. The enterprise’s proﬁts at time t equal






t − rj (x,t)kt − wtnt} (7)
where rj (x,t) is the equilibrium rental rate of capital of type x in industry j.
In equilibrium, entrepreneurship in any sector experiencing entry must carry the
same expected beneﬁt as working. The return from entrepreneurship is stochastic:
however, agents are risk neutral.9 Hence, in equilibrium,




j (¯ xjt,z t)ψ(zt)dzt (1 − E) (8)
where V j (x,zt) is the value of an enterprise of type (x,zt), described below. Note
that V j includes the discounted value of closing the ﬁrm and, if it is proﬁtable to do
so, returning to the labor market.
Let εjt b et h em a s so fe n t r a n t sa td a t et. If in equilibrium there is entry into any
two sectors j and j0,i tm u s tb et h a t
Z
V




(¯ xj0t,z t)ψ(zt)dzt (9)
In equilibrium, prices pjt are such that this free entry condition is satisﬁed with
equality.
If agents work, they earn a ﬂow of income wt. Since entrepreneurs must decide
between working and starting enterprises, the expected value of starting a enterprise








9With more general preferences, assuming complete insurance markets would imply that there
is no income uncertainty for individual agents, leading to the same result.
16where ι(t) is the interest rate at date t.
Each enterprise has a name m ∈ R, representing its unique entry in the business
register. Employment at enterprise m is n(m), and the measure of active enter-
prises10 at date t is μt. The number of entrepreneurs is
R




n(m)dμt ≤ 1 (11)
The set of enterprises in operation in industry j at date t is Mjt.D e ﬁne for any
two dates t,t0
Ξt,t0 = {m : m ∈ Mjt,m6∈ Mj,t0} (12)
Thus, for ∆ > 0, Ξt−∆,t is the set of enterprises that exited between time t − ∆
and t,w h e r e a sΞt,t−∆ is the set of enterprises that entered between those dates. If
μt (X) is the measure of any set X ⊆ Mjt of enterprises, the share of enterprises that
do not reach time t is
μt−∆(Ξt−∆,t)
μt(Mjt) , and the share of enterprises at time t that were
born since time t − ∆ is
μt(Ξt,t−∆)
μt(Mjt) .
Deﬁnition 1 Industry rates of entry and exit are:
















Deﬁnition 2 A stationary equilibrium or balanced growth path (BGP) is a measure
μ∗, a mass of entrants ε∗
j for each industry and time paths for prices p∗
jt such that the
labor market clears, the measure replicates itself, all households maximize (4) subject
to (5) given prices and expectations, and aggregate output yt grows at a constant rate.
This deﬁnition is similar to that in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) except that
this model distinguishes between industries. Also, because rates of investment-
speciﬁc and disembodied technical change diﬀer across industries, relative prices
will diverge along a balanced growth path, as in Greenwood et al (1997).
10The law of motion for μt is an equilibrium object. An explicit treatment of the law of motion
would complicate the presentation without adding any new insights and is available from the author
upon request. For μt to be stationary in equilibrium, later it will be convenient to redeﬁne the
establishment’s type in terms of the age of its technology rather than its level x.
17Proposition 1 There exists a unique balanced growth path with positive, constant
r a t e so fe n t r ya n de x i ti n t oa l ls e c t o r s .
The proof works as follows. An equilibrium with entry into all industries requires
the expected value of entry to be equal to the discounted value of working forever (10).
Along a BGP this value is stationary, so the decision problem of the entrepreneur
must be stationary too, implying that optimal decision rules are constant over time.
Given a constant ﬂow of entrants εj into each industry j, the stationary measure
of enterprises in each industry can be computed using the optimal decision rules.
Cobb-Douglas preferences imply constant expenditure shares, pinning down relative
industry sizes (and hence relative values of εj): only the scale is unknown. The proof
shows that there is a unique constant scaling factor that clears the labor market.
Proposition 2 Along a balanced growth path, rj (x,t)=( ρ + δ)/x.
This result is central to enterprise dynamics in the model. Enterprises using more
advanced capital than their competitors beneﬁt through cheaper capital services. On
the other hand, the fact that updating is costly implies that enterprises gradually fall
away from the frontier, whereas some of their competitors — either because they just
updated or because they are recent entrants — may use more advanced capital than
they do. The price of industry output declines along with the average cost of produc-
tion across the industry, whereas any given enterprise only beneﬁts from decreased
costs if it updates. As a result, gj introduces a downward trend in the marginal
revenue product of each enterprise, net of other aspects of enterprise dynamics.
This intuition suggests that rates of entry and exit may not be related to the
industry rate of disembodied technological progress κj, since it is not costly to adjust.
The price of output declines at a rate that oﬀsets DTC. However, since all enterprises
are at the frontier with respect to DTC, this has no inﬂuence on their lifecycle
decisions.
Establishment types can be re-speciﬁed in terms of the age of their technology a,
rather than its level x. This recasting is convenient as, in a stationary equilibrium,
the behavior of establishments of the same age will be similar regardless of the date.
Lemma 1 On a balanced growth path, an enterprise’s updating and exit decisions
depend only upon parameters indexed by industry j and the age of technology a,n o t
the date.
At any date, the entrepreneur’s problem can be represented recursively, and writ-
ten in terms of the technology’s age a instead of the level of ISTC x.
To analyze the entrepreneur’s decision problem, consider a simple case in which:
18Assumption 1 Productivity z ∈ {0,1}, ζ =0 ,a n dz =0is an absorbing state.
Under this assumption there is only one positive value of the shock z, and there
is no updating. Solving for optimal input use, the enterprise’s exit behavior is the











subject to the boundary condition
V
j (a,z) ≥ U. (16)
The value V j (a,z) can be interpreted in terms of a put option with strike price U.
The owner earns proﬁt ﬂow πj (a,z), and experiences a capital gain
∂V j(a,z)
∂a (which
is negative) due to the fact that the proﬁt ﬂow declines with age. At any point in
time, the owner may close the enterprise, in which case she earns U but gives up the
ability to earn V j (a,z) in the future. Finally, the owner may be forced to exercise
the option at Poisson rate χ.





















subject to the boundary conditions
V
j (a,z) ≥ U and V
j (a,z) ≥ V
j (0,zζ). (18)
Equation (17) diﬀers from (15) in that z is stochastic, and that the option to update
implies an additional boundary condition.
Denote by T∗ (z) the age at which the technology becomes obsolete — the age
at which either the option to exit or to update are exercised. Let Υ∗ (z) ∈ {0,1}
equal one if the enterprise optimally updates, and let X∗ (z) ∈ {0,1} equal one if the
enterprise optimally exits.
Equilibrium lifecycle dynamics are straightforward. An enterprise is born, and
experiences productivity shocks while falling behind the technological frontier. Even-
tually, at age T∗ (z), the enterprise either updates or — if zt is suﬃciently low — closes.
19The industry-speciﬁc parameters that might aﬀect lifecycle dynamics are gj (the
rate of ISTC), κj (disembodied technical change), Aj0 (initial productivity) and ωj
(preferences). Notice that, combining (8) and (10), U can be written in terms of V j
so that the solution to problem (17) does not depend on industry variables that enter
multiplicatively, such as Aj0 and ωj (which enters through prices). Also, disembodied
technical progress is oﬀset by declining prices, so that proﬁts are independent of κj.
As a result:
Proposition 3 Along a BGP, optimal entry and exit rules depend on gj, but do not
depend on κj, Aj0,n o rωj.
5 ISTC and model industry dynamics
This section has several objectives. In a simple version of the model without updat-
ing, equilibrium entry and exit rates are proven to be positively related to gj. Then,
in a calibration of the general model to US data, simulations indicate that entry and
exit rates are positively related to gj even when updating is allowed. In addition,
enterprises in the calibrated model turn out to display investment spikes when they
update, and the presence these spikes is also positively linked to gj. Entry costs
also compress rates of entry and exit across industries with diﬀerent rates of ISTC.
Thus, lifecycle dynamics in the calibrated model are consistent with all the empirical
ﬁndings in Section 2.
5.1 Entry and exit in a simple vintage capital model
To characterize the impact of ISTC on the timing of exit, for now let Assumption 1
hold, so there is no updating and the value function reduces to (15).A si nat y p i c a l
vintage capital model, only entrants have access to the frontier technology. This
focuses the model on when,r a t h e rt h a nwhether,t oe x i t .
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, T∗ is strictly decreasing in gj,a n dr a t e so f
entry and exit are strictly increasing in gj.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1, rates of entry and exit are strictly increasing in
the rate of decline in the relative price of capital used by each industry.
Two eﬀects impact whether high gj involves earlier exit. Enterprises fall behind
the frontier at a rate that depends on gj, which encourages earlier exit. On the other
20hand, a high value of gj also lowers the proﬁts from re-entry, which discourages exit.
T h ep r o o fs h o w st h a tt h eﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second.11
While the simple vintage model with Assumption 1 reproduces the ISTC-turnover
relationship in Section 2, it does not replicate the entry cost interaction:
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1, entry costs disproportionately lower entry and
exit rates in industries with low rates of ISTC.
When there is no updating, agents must pay the entry cost to adopt a new
technology. Entry costs delay adoption: however, they delay adoption mainly for
industries with low gj — which already have low adoption rates — as a further delay
in adoption is least costly in such industries. Entry costs increase cross-industry
variation in entry and exit rates — contrary to the evidence. We will examine below
whether the same is true in the more general model: however, the proposition suggests
that the possibility of updating will be essential to matching the ISTC-entry cost
interaction seen in the data.
5.2 Entry and exit in the model with updating
Returning to the general model without Assumption 1, the result in Proposition 4
can no longer be proven analytically. However, there are several reasons why the
general model might be expected to account for the data even better than the simple
model. Two additional channels aﬀect industry rates of entry and exit: the following
discussion assumes for simplicity that ζ (gj)=ζ.
First, if enterprises may update, then whether or not enterprises exit depends on








dg > 0, then higher rates of ISTC are associated with a larger set of enterprise
types exiting instead of updating. The threshold z∗ is endogenous and depends on
the distribution ψ,s oz∗ cannot be derived analytically. However, taking the total













11Industries with a high capital share should also experience more entry and exit, something
that is consistent with the results of Audretsch (1991). This is because the rate at which a plant’s
proﬁtability falls behind the frontier is αk
1−αn−αk × gj.
21It is straightforward to show that V j
z (0,z∗ζ) > 0,a n dt h a tV j
g is negative and larger
in magnitude for larger z. Thus, dz∗
dg > 0 provided that z∗ is "large" relative to the
shock values drawn by entrants. This dovetails with the fact that low initial shock
values are a natural feature of many models that wish to match the higher exit rates
among entrants documented by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989).
Second, there exists a productivity value z∗∗ such that enterprises drawing z ≤ z∗∗




j (0,z)ψ(z)dz = V
j (0,z
∗∗). (21)
Clearly z∗∗ = z∗ζ and dz∗∗
dg = ζ dz∗
dg . Hence, depending on the form of ψ,h i g h e rr a t e s
of ISTC may induce stronger selection among enterprises, so that a larger proportion
of the type space exits instead of updating once its technology has become obsolete.
What about the interaction of entry costs and gj? In the data, the fact that
turnover decreases more in industries with high ISTC requires d2z∗
dgdE < 0.E q u a t i o n
(20) suggests this might hold, as the expression for dz∗
dg is decreasing in E when
dz∗
dg > 0. However, the derivatives of V j in equation (20) also depend on E indirectly,
so that the condition d2z∗
dgdE < 0 cannot be proven analytically.
5.3 Calibration
We now calibrate the model to US industry and macroeconomic data, to assess to
what extent the model is capable of reproducing the stylized facts presented earlier.
The calibration procedure is as follows. First, along a balanced growth path,
several parameters can be determined from aggregate data using the procedure of
Kydland and Prescott (1982). Then, parameters that govern the enterprise lifecycle
are chosen by calibrating a "typical" industry. Finally, given the values of gj for the
41 industries presented in Table 2, the aggregate economy can be constructed using
reported industry shares of GDP.
T h ec a l i b r a t e dm o d e li sad i s c r e t et i m ea p p r o x i m a t i o nt ot h ec o n t i n u o u sm o d e l
presented herein, and is discussed in detail in the working version of the paper.
Period length is one year, and η =1 . Productivity z is drawn from a grid of 100
points, where z ∈ (0,1].
Computing industry exit rates requires calibrating the distribution ψ of entrant
productivity and the process f that changes productivity thereafter. The distribution
ψ is modeled as a log normal distribution truncated at the end points, with mean
μψ and standard deviation σψ. Dunne et al (1989) ﬁnd that enterprises tend to grow
22faster early in life, suggesting that zt at a given enterprise may trend upwards over
time. Assume that
logzt+1 = ξ logzt +  t+1
where the disturbances  t+1 are normal with mean zero and standard deviation σε,
but the distribution is truncated so that zt ∈ (0,1] ∀t.12
The adoption cost function ζ (gj)=¯ ζ − θgj. As we shall see, the sensitivity
of adoption costs to ISTC (parameter θ) is important for many of the quantitative
results below. As a benchmark we set θ =0 , but consider values of θ ∈ [0,10].W h e n
θ =1 0 , adoption costs in an industry with gj =0 .01 and one with gj =0 .08 diﬀer by
af a c t o ro f6.13 For a given value of θ, the value of ¯ ζ is chosen so that ζ (gj) equals
t h eb e n c h m a r kv a l u ef o rt h em e d i a ngj.
To calibrate the model requires values for μψ, σψ, ξ, σε, ζ, χ, E and ρ.S o m eo f
these parameters can be mapped into the model directly from aggregate data:
1. A value of αn =0 .63 lies in the mid-range of estimates of the labor share. As
for αk, the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports that income from equity and
proprietorships has averaged 12 percent of GDP since the 1950s. Identifying
this with 1 − (αk + αn) yields αk =0 .25.14
2 .T h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eρ is related to the equilibrium return on capital.
Greenwood et al (1997) use a value of 0.07. The US NIPA report economic
growth of 2.2 percent per year over the post-war period, implying that ρ =
0.045.
3. Demand parameters ωj can be computed from the shares of GDP made up by
each of the 41 industries in the data set. I exclude the share of GDP made up
for by government services and farming, which averaged about 15 percent over
the postwar period.
12To see how this is trends upwards, consider that logzt+1 =l o gzt − (1 − ξ)logzt +  t+1,w h e r e
 t+1 is drawn from a normal distribution, truncated so as to keep zt+1 ≤ 1. The extent to which
ﬁrms are likely to increase is lower depending on their size. If ξ<1 then ﬁrms will be drawn
towards z =1 , which is the upper bound.
13Such large adjustment cost diﬀerences are empirically reasonable. For example, Greenwood
and Jovanovic (2001) ﬁnd that investments in information technology (IT) have a rate of return of
about 2000 percent, interpreting this as an indicator of unmeasured adoption costs.
14Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) estimate that in US manufacturing, 9 p e r c e n to fo u t p u tc a n n o tb e
accounted for as payments to capital nor labor. On the other hand, they also estimate a "span
of control" parameter of 15 percent. Thus, depending on the interpretation of 1 − (αk + αn),t h i s
suggests that αk ∈ [0.22,0.28]. We will also discuss values in this range.
234. The entry cost E captures both technological factors ET and institutional
factors EC. Waddell, Ritz, Norton and Wood (1966) report that it takes about
a year to set up a enterprise in most industries, and one year is also the time-
to-build assumed in Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Campbell (1998). This
points to a technological delay d =1 ,s ot h a tET =1−e−ρ. As for institutional
entry costs, Djankov et al (2002) report that the formal cost of entry in the
United States as a percentage of GDP per capita is negligible. Hence, in the
benchmark economy, bureaucratic costs EC =0 .
To study the interaction of entry costs and ISTC requires selecting a range of
values of EC, the formal cost of entry in terms of expected proﬁts, for the countries
in the study. According to Djankov et al (2002), the cost of entry ranges between 5.6
percent and 81 percent of GDP per capita. This corresponds to EC ∈ [0.003,0.046].
Param. αk αn μψ σψ ξσ ε χζ ρE T EC θ
Value 0.25 0.63 0.084 1.56 0.75 0.20 .089 0.69 0.045 0.044 0 0
Table 7 — Parameters used in the benchmark calibration.
Detailed data on industry dynamics are mostly available only for the manu-
facturing sector. Hence, the remaining parameters are chosen so that a "typical"
manufacturing industry in the model economy behaves as the manufacturing sector
does overall. I do so by considering an industry in which gj takes the median value
for the manufacturing sector (the median and the mean are both about 0.04), and
choosing the remaining parameters to match several features of the lifecycle of man-
ufacturing enterprises in the US. This approach is made possible by the fact that, in
equilibrium, the optimal decision rules in each industry do not depend on the level
of prices or wages. The six remaining parameters are μψ, σψ, ζ, ξ, σε,a n dχ,a n d
the six statistics to be matched are:
1. the average exit rate, reported in Dunne et al (1989).15
2 . t h ee x i tr a t ea m o n gt h ey o u n g( a g e d0 - 5y e a r s ) ,r e p o r t e di nD u n n ee ta l( 1 9 8 9 ) .
3. the average growth rate — from David S. Evans (1987a).
15Dunne et al (1989) report the exit rate based on the Census of Manufactures, which is conducted
every 5 years. This rate is 0.36. Since the model is annual, the calibrated annual exit rate will
exceed 1 − (1 − 0.36)
0.2, as many entrants would exit without ever appearing in the Census. The
same applies to the exit rate among the young, which is 0.40. These data are for establishments,
nor enterprises, but similarly detailed data for enterprises was not available.
244. the average growth rate among the young — from Evans (1987a).
5. the log standard deviation of growth rates — from Evans (1987b).
6. the "lumpiness" of investment. Doms and Dunne (1998) report that the share
of establishments experiencing an increase in the capital stock of 30 percent
or higher is 6 percent.16 This requires the model to ﬁt not just the mean and
standard deviation of growth rates but also the skewness of the growth rate
distribution. Lumpiness in the model is related to the frequency of updating
by incumbents.
Table 7 reports the resulting parameters, and Table 8 reports summary model
statistics. The matches are generally quite tight. Interestingly, average size among
entrants is only 2/3 of the average size among all enterprises. This is in spite of the
fact that entrants adopt the frontier technology, as in a canonical vintage capital
model.
In the model, the exogenous annual exit rate is χ =0 .089.T h ea n n u a le x i tr a t e
is 12.6 percent. Thus, annual turnover in the median industry of about 4 percent is
endogenous and due to ISTC, the remainder being attributed to factors that are not
modeled explicitly.
Statistic US data Model
5-year exit rate (young) 0.40 0.40
5-year exit rate 0.36 0.36
Growth rate (young) 0.06 0.06
Growth rate 0.02 0.02
Growth rate, log s.d. −2 −2
enterprises with investment lumps 0.06 0.05
Table 8 — Model statistics used in calibration. The column
"Model" report the behavior of the median manufacturing
industry, which is Manufacturing Not Elsewhere Classiﬁed.
16The published version of Doms and Dunne (1998) reports a diﬀerent number, but entrants and
exiters are excluded from that sample. 6 percent is the value in the panel that includes entry and
exit. This is also the median industry value in Compustat.




































Figure 3: Industry rates of entry and exit, depending on the industry rate of ISTC
a n do nt h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nI S T Ca n da d o p t i o nc o s t s(θ).R a t e s o f e n t r y a n d
exit are positively related to ISTC, and the relationship is stronger for larger values
of θ.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 ISTC and Turnover
In the data, rates of ISTC range from 1 to 8 percent across industries. In the model,
when θ =0 , this generates a range of annual entry rates from 11.8 to 13.4 percent
per year. A higher rate of ISTC increases industry turnover even though incumbents
have the option to update instead of exiting. In the data, entry rates range from 8.7
to 17.1 percent, so the benchmark model covers about one ﬁfth of the range.17
Larger values of θ are be associated with a wider divergence of cross-industry
turnover rates generated by gj,a sθ>0 implies that adoption by incumbents becomes
costlier for higher gj.S e eF i g u r e3. A way to get a sense of the magnitude of this
relationship is to regress ISTC for the 41 industries on their turnover rates in the
model economy — see Table 9. These coeﬃcients are always positive. In the case of
turnover, they range from about a third of the coeﬃcient in the data when θ =0to
three quarters when θ =5and 115 percent when θ =1 0 .
Figure 4 depicts the impact of parameter changes on the optimal decision rules.
17When the model is re-calibrated for values of αk ∈ [0.22,0.28],t h em o d e lc o v e r s12−30 percent
of the range when θ =0 .
26Consider the north west cell of Figure 4, which corresponds to gj =0 .01 and θ =0 .
F i r m sv a r yb yp r o d u c t i v i t yzt and age, measured in years. Firms are born somewhere
on the vertical axis, depending on their initial draw of zt. For example, a newborn
ﬁrm with zt =0 .5 is at the center of the vertical axis. As it ages it moves towards the
right, horizontally if it maintains its value of zt, or stepping up or down whenever it
receives a positive or negative productivity shock. At some point as it moves towards
the right it may touch the boundary of the area labelled "Update", in which case it
returns to the vertical axis at a point ζzt. Alternatively, it might touch the boundary
of the region labeled "Exit", in which case the ﬁrm closes. If the ﬁrm was born with
al o wv a l u eo fzt (about 0.2), then the ﬁrm exits immediately.
ISTC coeﬃcient
Data Model, Model, Model,
θ =0 θ =5 θ =1 0
Turnover 1.24∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(0.326) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Entry 0.81∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exit 0.43∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 9 — Coeﬃcients of a regression of turnover
measures on ISTC. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The ﬁrst column corresponds to the data and is drawn
from Table 3. The remaining columns represent the model
economy. Standard errors in the model economy are
negligible by construction as ISTC is the only source
of cross-industry variation.
When θ =0 , the size of the "Exit" region plays very little role in the link between
turnover and ISTC. Observe the leftmost column of Figure 4: the line separating
regions of the type space corresponding to exit and updating does not vary with
the value of gj. In fact, under 1 percent of enterprises lie between the value of z∗
corresponding to gj =0 .04 and the values of z∗ corresponding to other choices of
gj ∈ [0.01,0.08]. On the other hand, the size of the "Update" area varies a lot with
gj.T h u s ,w h e nθ is low, z is the main determinant of which enterprises exit, whereas


















































































Figure 4: Decision rules for diﬀerent rates of ISTC gj and diﬀerent values of the
adoption cost parameter θ. The exit threshold z∗ is visibly more sensitive to changes
in gj when θ is high, whereas the date of updating or exit T∗ is more sensitive to gj
when θ is low.



















Figure 5: Investment lumpiness and ISTC in the model economy, θ =0 . Lumpiness
is the proportion of ﬁrms in the model economy that display an investment "spike"
each year, in an industry with a given rateo fI S T C .T h i ss h a r ei si n c r e a s i n gi nt h e
rate of ISTC, as in the data.
28For high values of θ, however, the set of enterprises that exits is much more
sensitive to gj, as a change in gj also corresponds to an increase in the eventual costs
of continuation. For instance, when θ =5 , 9 percent of enterprises lie between the
value of z∗ corresponding to gj =0 .04 and the value of z∗ corresponding to gj =0 .08.
When θ =1 0this proportion rises to 33 percent.
5.4.2 ISTC and investment lumpiness
Not only does a higher rate of ISTC lead to earlier exit in the model: among enter-
prises that do not close, it also leads to earlier updating. This too has a signiﬁcant
impact on lifecycle dynamics: although it does not lead to exit, it leads to a "spike"
in investment at the enterprise level. As in Doms and Dunne (1998), a "spike" is de-
ﬁned as a year in which investment expenditures exceed 30 percent of the enterprise
capital stock. In the model, such spikes may occur because of large changes in zt or
because of updating but, in the calibrated economy, all the spikes in the benchmark
economy are due to updating.
Figure 5 shows that the frequency of investment spikes is positively related to the
rate of ISTC. In the model economy a 1 percent increase in the rate of ISTC leads
to a 2.5 percent increase in the prevalence of investment spikes,18 r o u g h l yh a l fo ft h e
value in Section 2.
5.4.3 ISTC and Entry costs
Section 2 reports that entry costs reduce turnover in industries in which ISTC is
rapid, compared to industries in which it is sluggish. Using the entry cost measures
of Djankov et al (2002) and the industry ISTC measures constructed in this paper, I
used the model to compute entry and exit rates for each of the 41 industries in the 18
countries in Eurostat. Then, I ran the same diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences regression on
the artiﬁcial data. As in the "true" data, the interaction coeﬃcients are all negative.
Once more, matching the magnitude of the empirical coeﬃcients turns out to require
al a r g ev a l u eo fθ — see Table 10.H i g hθ increases the share of ﬁrms that exit instead
of updating, so that an increase in entry costs has an impact on the behavior of a
larger share of entrepreneurs in any given industry.
18Variation in θ does not signiﬁcantly change this coeﬃcient.
29Speciﬁcation Turnover Interaction
measure coeﬃcient
Baseline spec., Turnover -0.68
with Eurostat data. Entry -0.31
Exit -0.37
Baseline spec., Turnover -0.07
with model pseudo- Entry -0.03
data. θ =0 . Exit -0.03
Baseline spec., Turnover -0.50
with model pseudo- Entry -0.25
data. θ =1 0 . Exit -0.25
Table 10 —A r t i ﬁcial entry and exit data generated with the model,
regressed on an interaction of ISTC and entry costs. The results
are compared with the same regression using Eurostat data (Table 5).
The qualitative results are similar, but the model requires a
large eﬀect of technological change on adjustment costs θ
to generate interaction coeﬃcients of similar magnitude to
the data. For the artiﬁcial data the R
2 is almost 100 percent
by construction, as ISTC and entry costs are the only sources
of variation in the artiﬁcial data.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by two observations. First, cross-industry diﬀerences in
entry and exit rates remain largely unexplained by measures of industry proﬁtability
or entry barriers. Second, vintage capital models in general have a strong prediction:
if technical progress is embodied in the enterprise, then rates of technical progress
should be positively related to rates of entry and exit. The paper concentrates upon
the case of technical progress in the production of the capital goods used by each
industry, ﬁnding support for this basic prediction of vintage models. Moreover, the
model economy accounts for the relationship between turnover and the rate ISTC,
30provided there is a positive link between this rate and adoption costs. The data and
the model both point to an interaction between the costs of entry and the diﬀusion of
new technologies through entry and exit. However, a full assessment of the welfare
implications of policy might require endogenizing the rate of ISTC, for example
allowing ﬁrms to substitute between capital goods with diﬀerent rates of ISTC. This
is left for future work.
A Appendix
A.1 Data
An "enterprise" is deﬁned as a legal entity, identiﬁed from the business register in
each country: registering is required to legally produce and sell goods and services,
and to pay taxes. If an enterprise ceases operations, by law it must notify the business
register within a few months.19 This is similar to the deﬁnition of a "ﬁrm" according
to the United States Census Bureau.
Mergers and changes of legal status are distinguished from "true" entries and
exits. For example, changes of legal status can be identiﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h e
number of enterprises at the beginning or end of the event does not change, whereas
mergers aﬀect some number n>1 of enterprises leaving one enterprise at the end:
this changes the number of enterprises but is not counted as entry nor exit.20
The data follow Council Regulation (EC) 58/97, which resolved to "establish a
common framework for the collection, compilation, transmission and evaluation of
Community statistics on the structure, activity, competitiveness and performance of
businesses in the Community." However, participation was not mandatory. Hence,
t h ep a p e rd o e sn o tr e p o r tr e s u l t sf o rF r a n c ea n dG e r m a n y . G e r m a n yd i dn o tp a r -
ticipate and, while France did participate, it did not distribute the data through
Eurostat at the time of writing.
In this paper, industry classiﬁc a t i o n sa r eb a s e do nt h eN o r t hA m e r i c a nI n d u s t r y
Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) used by the BEA capital ﬂow tables.21 The 61 non-
farm industries reported in the capital ﬂow tables are aggregated to 41 industries,
to yield a coarser classiﬁcation system that allows concordance with the Eurostat
19Individual country registration rules may be found at:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/sbs_base_an2.htm




31data. The aggregation process is generally straightforward: for example, Healthcare
aggregates Ambulatory health care services, Hospitals, Nursing and residential care
facilities, and Social assistance.22
Eurostat uses the Nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans les Com-
munautés européennes (NACE) classiﬁcation system, Revision 1.1. The Bank of
Canada kindly provides a detailed concordance table for the NAICS and NACE
Rev. 1.1 systems.23 Two industries from the BEA’s list — "Management of compa-
nies and enterprises" and "Administrative and support services" — were diﬃcult to
map into Eurostat, and were left out of the analysis.
A.2 Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1 is a consequence of the propositions and lemmata below.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2. The household’s ﬁrst order condition for investment







The return to capital must be equal and, since the cost of capital is linear in x−1,
that means the return to a unit of capital must also be linear in x−1 for there to be
investment (or disinvestment) in all types. Moreover it means that the rental rate




rj (¯ xjt,t) (23)
or, for any technology τ ≤ t,f r o m(22), rj (x,t)=rj (¯ xj0,t)e−gjτ,w h e r erj (¯ xj0,t)
is the interest rate on capital of vintage zero and τ i st h ed a t ea tw h i c ht e c h n o l o g y
x was the frontier for industry j,s ox =¯ xjte−gjτ. Thus, capital is relatively more
22The resulting industries are Oil and gas extraction; Other mining; Utilities; Construction;
Wood products; Nonmetal products; Primary and fabricated metal products; General Machin-
ery; Computers and electronic prod.; Electrical machinery; Transport Equip.; Manuf n.e.c.; Food
products; Textiles; Leather; Paper, printing, software; Petroleum and coal products; Chemicals;
Plastics and Rubber; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Air transport; Water transport; Land trans-
port; Transport support; Broadcasting; Information and data processing; Finance (not insurance;
trusts); Insurance; trusts; Real estate; Rental services; Legal services; Systems design; Technical




32expensive to rent for enterprises with older technology. Note that we can rewrite
the enterprise’s problem in terms of τ instead of in terms of x. In addition, let
˜ pj (x,t)=
R ∞
t e−(ρ+δ)(t−s)rj (x,s)ds be the discounted value of rentals of a unit of
capital — where a constant discount rate is assumed as along a BGP. Diﬀerentiating
with respect to t, the marginal product of capital is
rj (x,t)=( ρ + δ)˜ pj (x,t) −
d˜ pj (x,t)
dt
Optimal investment requires that ˜ pj (x,t)=x−1,s ot h a t
d˜ pj(x,t)
dt =0 . Substituting,
we have that rj (x,t)=( ρ + δ)x−1.
Proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 3. Notice that production is a static



















































Suppose labor is the numeraire. Then the value of an entrant must be constant over
time, so that, if φj i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fpjt then
φj = −gjαk − κj,p jt = pj0e
−(αkgj+κj)t (26)












1−αn−αk [(ρ + δ)¯ xj0]
−αk
1−αn−αk,a n d
a = t − τ is the age of the enterprise’s technology (with respect to the frontier),







a or, setting γj =
αkgj




t , π(zt,a)=Bjste−γja. Thus, here, enterprise proﬁts depend only on z and
on the distance from the industry frontier. With this under our belts, we can write
the enterprise’s problem recursively, impose condition (8) for industry j, and divide
through by Bj to obtain value function (17), which does not depend on the date,
only on industry parameters.
33Proof of Proposition 1. Let μ∗
j be the measure of enterprises in industry j in a
steady state. Suppose μ∗
j exists and is unique. Set the numeraire wt =1 .A ss h o w n




ωj,s opjcj = ωjsc where sc is total spending on consumption and the demand
for each good j is cj = sc
ωj
pj . Hence, whatever spending on consumption might be,






j . Now in a BGP it must be
that their income is growing. So, for constant labor, we need wt/p to be constant
over time, so gp = gw.S e t t i n gw =1to be the numeraire, then gp =1 .R e c a l lt h a t
pjt d r o p so v e rt i m ea tr a t e−φj. Given a constant mass of enterprises μ∗
j, real output
grows at rate −φj, so this equation holds provided cj0 = sc
ωj
pj0.N o wpj0 is given by

















Real consumption grows at a constant rate
P
j φjωj, and the share of each type
of good is constant and given by pj0. Notice that the output of each enterprise is
not linear in pj0 (it is strictly convex) so that for any pj0 there is a unique mass of
enterprises in that industry that can satisfy demand for a given value of consumption
spending sc. (which pins down the entry rates εj). Conversely, given a total mass of
enterprises sc and the distribution of enterprises over industries is given. Preferences
a r es u c ht h a tac o n s t a n ts h a r eo fi n c o m ei si n v e s t e d ,s oi tr e m a i n st oc h e c kt h a t
income is constant (in units of labor) and that the labor market clears. Turning to the
budget constraint, income in (in units of labor) is constant provided the measure over
enterprises is constant. Income is linear in the total number of enterprises. Hence,
the number of enterprises that clears the labor market is the equilibrium number,
which leads to equilibrium values of income, spending, and all other variables as
above. Such a number exists because labor supply is inelastic — see Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993).
It remains to verify that, given constant decision rules T,X and Υ,a n dg i v e na
constant volume of entrants εj, there exists a unique measure of agents μ∗
j that is
invariant over time for each industry. This veriﬁcation is notationally cumbersome
without being informative and is available from the author upon request.



















34where the constant Bj h a sb e e nd i v i d e do u ta si te n t e r sV j (and hence Uj)m u l t i -
plicatively. Although this is a continuous time problem, it can be approached using
discrete time recursive methods. Dividing through by s,t h eﬁrst order conditions
for T given Uj require e−γjT = ρUj,s ot h a tT is decreasing in Uj. Suppose Uj is
the payoﬀ assuming that γj =0 . That is strictly larger than V j (0,s)(1− E),s ot h e
true solution (if it exists) necessarily has T larger than T∗∗, which is the solution to
that problem.
Now consider the same problem subject to T ∈ [T∗∗,∞),a n dw r i t et h eB e l l m a n
equation
BV














where B is the Bellman operator. Blackwell’s conditions are satisﬁed (because T is
bounded) so B is a contraction and the problem has a unique solution.


































1−E − e−ρT¤ . (31)






















ρ =0 , so the condition is

























.I ft h e r ee x i s t sγ such
that Tγ > 0 then there must exist a γ such that T = ˆ T. However, the only solution
35to this equation is ˆ T =0 ,a n dT is always positive, so we have a contradiction.
The remainder of the proof is to show that the steady state entry and exit rate is
increasing in T∗.L e t∆ > 0.T h ee x i tr a t ea s∆ → 0 is lim∆→+0˜ ξ (∆)/∆+χ,w h e r e












Proof of Proposition 5. Deriving the expression for T∗ with respect to E and




















1−E − e−ρT¤2 + T
∗
E












and as g →∞the cross derivative goes to zero. Algebraic manipulation shows that
T∗
Eg is monotonic in g (i.e. T∗
Egg > 0), so that T∗
gE < 0 always. The result follows as




1 − e−χT ∗,Ωg = −Tg
χΩ
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